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Article 10

Euthanasia: A Soft Paradigm
for Medical Ethics
Russell L. McIntyre, Th.D.

After serving as assistant professor of religion, Catholic University of America from 1969-1975,
Doctor McIntyre spent a year at
Harvard Medical School as a Kennedy Fellow in Medical Ethics. He
currently is director of Programs
in the Health Care Humanities,
College of Medicine and Dentistry
of New Jersey .

Ethics has always been one, if not the primary, concern of the
medical practitioner. Every physician is familiar with the ancient Hippocratic Oath and aware of the current "code of ethics" promulgated
by the American Medical Association. Indeed, among the professions,
physicians have continuously been ranked among the leaders in public
trust with, unfortunately, politicians, businessmen and clergy ranking
far below. Recent developments in biomedical research and medical
therapeutics have begun to raise new and vitally serious questions
regarding the appropriate use of medical information and therapy, and
of adequate controls for biotechnical experimentation.
Achievements in medicine and science in the past forty years have
given man new power over acute and chronic disease, physical and
mental debilitations, and the mechanical support of deteriorating
bodily functions. With the discovery of anesthesia, antiobiotics, and
insulin ; the techniques of surgical excision, and chemotherapy; and
the technologies of life-support systems, have come new and difficult
responsibilities. In an important way, medical science has been too
successful too rapidly . Technologies have increased our capacity to
overcome many human problems of disease and debilitation. But success has come before we have adequately explored the potential
abuses of the technology and before we have defined its appropriate
and inappropriate uses.
"Euthanasia" is both an ancient and modern controversy. It is one
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of those morally loaded words which provokes both outrage and
sympathy; it conjures up images of diabolical practices as well as
feelings of mercy for the release from painful dying.
The moral justifications for the arguments pro and con euthanasia
were largely developed before modern technological therapeutics were
discovered. The rapid development of medical technologies is now
forcing a new ethical re-thinking on every aspect of life, especially the
processes of birth and death. What is all too apparent today is that
many ethicists, moralists, philosophers and theologians, are continuing
the debate with the stale ammunition of pre-technologic notions. This
is not to infer that these ideas are totally inappropriate but, rather,
that serious re-thinking must be done to intensify the present debate.
The term " euthanasia" combines two Greek words, meaning
"good," and "death." The term does not mean that death is good. All
it refers to is the condition under which a person passes from life into
death. It is sometimes called a "merciful death" meaning that the
person did not suffer long and hard before death occurred.l
Discussion of euthanasia is usually classified according to the methods used to hasten or induce death and whether or not death is a
self-chosen end. The terms most employed are: active or passive and
voluntary or involuntary . Active euthanasia would refer to the direct
administration of something for the express purpose of terminating a
suffering and terminally ill patient's life. Examples would be a megadose of morphine or a bubble of air in a strategic vein. Passive euthanasia refers to two different types of actions: first, the failure to
employ various medical therapies because it is believed that they
would not serve to prolong life as much as they would serve to prolong death . Examples would be to withhold antibiotics in a terminally
ill person with pneumonia; not connecting a person to a needed respirator; deciding not to institute dialysis despite renal failure; or deciding
not to give calories along with IV fluids for a comatose patient. The
second type would be the withdrawal of a patient from life-sustaining
medical technologies even though death is anticipated. An example of
this second type of passive euthanasia would be to turn off a respirator.
Voluntary euthanasia would refer to either active or passive measures performed at the behest of the patient. Involuntary euthanasia
would refer to active or passive measures performed on a patient who
cannot make his or her wishes known because of incompetency. An
example would be someone in a "persistent vegetable state" (e.g.,
Karen Ann Quinlan).
We must note that in each of these there are tremendously complicated ethical issues. They become further compounded as we combine
possibilities, such as active-involuntary euthanasia.
The physician today is placed in a true moral dilemma. His mandate
as a physician includes at least three major responsibilities: to protect,
preserve, and promote life; to do no harm; and to alleviate suffering.
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The dilemma presents itself when not all three can be achieved at the
same time with the same patient. For example: does his mandate to
preserve and protect life exist above all else? Does this mean that all
life should be preserved as long as technically possible? If his patient is
in intractable pain, does his mandate to alleviate suffering mean that
he can administer increasing dosages of narcotics even though vital
functions will be so depressed that they will eventually become lifethreatening? What is the content of his mandate to do no harm,
primum non nocere? What is harm? Is it forcing a person to endure
excruciating pain or is it to succumb to an earlier demise? Deciding for
one alternative means the subjugation of the others.
Selection of Certain Values
Medicine is not now, nor has it ever been, a value-free enterprise.
The practice of medicine is the selection of certain values of health as
being normative for the society and the labeling of other non-normative values as deviancy or illness. 2 Advances in medical technology are
forcing us to re-think our basic moral positions. Are there circumstances which make life not worth living, in spite of the fact that
biologically we can be mechanically sustained? Are there circumstances in which life should be terminated? Should patients who are
suffering and dying be allowed to "die with dignity" by withdrawing
or failing to employ life-sustaining procedures? Should their lives be
taken by death-dealing narcotics? Should such steps be taken only at
the request of the patient, or in consultation with his family and his
doctor?3 The dilemma involves the prioritizing of specific values, such
as the sanctity of life; the principle of least suffering; the concepts of
human dignity, personal autonomy, and justice; the right to live; and
the quality of the life that might be salvaged.
In Western culture, Christianity once defined the meaning and order
of these ethical principles. "With the secularization of our society,
however, ethical values have become autonomous."4 There is no
longer a common commitment to these basic values. And with no
general commitment to values, we have no general expectation with
regard to how medicine or society should answer this medical dilemma. There exists today "a great deal of conceptual confusion associated with our feelings about life and death."5
I am going to suggest that euthanasia need not be the demon first
supposed and that it even has a morally acceptable place in our contemporary understanding of patient care for the terminally ill. But I
want to make it explicitly clear at the outset that I have what I believe
to be reasonable and acceptable limits to the development of a policy
of euthanasia. In the line-drawing will be the parameters for my "soft"
paradigm.
Our purpose is twofold: first, to encourage a new and healthy
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debate on all aspects of the euthanasia issue without loading the
"moral gun" before the debate begins, thus I will purposefully not use
the term "killing" in my description because of its pejorative moral
content;6 and, second, to set forth a process understanding of life and
death that might more adequately inform today's pastoral concerns.
Technology has brought us to the threshhold ofa new era in medical care. The old arguments for and against euthanasia cannot simply
be transferred to the new debate without a serious re-examination of
their moral presuppositions. Just as our understanding of when death
occurs has been radically restudied and redefined in recent years,7 so
also our understanding of the "process" of dying must be re-examined. Hopefully, this paper will be a start in that re-examination.
A. The Ethical Argument: The Opposite Extremes

1. The conservative, called the formalist or de ontological, position
places absolute value on all forms of human life no matter how debilitated. Therefore, no person has the authority to terminate any human
life. In opposition to any policy of euthanasia, this position stresses
the sanctity of life per se, and claims that life always has value regardless of its qUality.8 This has traditionally been the position of the
Roman Catholic Church which has claimed that we hold life as a gift
from God in trust, and, therefore, only God can take life. 9 And this is
the position enshrined in the Catholic Hospital Association guideline
which states that "Euthanasia in all its forms is prohibited. "10
This was also the position of Albert Schweitzer as put forth in his
famous "Reverence for Life" essay. He defended the position by saying:
"Objection is made to this ethic that it sets too high a value on natural life ....
The ethic of reverence for life is found particularly strange because it enables
no dividing line between higher and lower,' between more valuable and less
valuable life. For this omission it had its reasons. To undertake to lay down
universally valid distinctions of value between differing kinds of life will end in
judging them by the greater or lesser distance at which they seem to stand from
us as human beings - as we ourselves judge. But that is a purely subjective
criterion. Who among us knows what significance any other kind of life has in
itself, and as part of the universe. "11

2. The liberal, called the utilitarian, position uses certain qualitative
measures to determine the relative value of sustaining a life when seen
against the backdrop of competing values. This position holds that
biological life is not an end in itself, but only a means to other ends,
namely productive human activities. One of the most extreme examples would be a statement by ethicist David H. Smith in which he said
that he does not consider every product of the human wom b a person. 12 Another example would be the so-called "indicators of humanhood" of Joseph Fletcher. He lists twenty criteria for establishing
human personhood. Among these are self-awareness, self-control, a
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sense of time (past and future), the capability to relate to others,
curiosity, and minimal intelligence. With regard to minimal intelligence he writes, " ... any individual ... who falls below the LQ.
40-Mark ... is questionably a person; below the 20-Mark, not a person. "13 Mongoloids, mental defectives, irretrievably comatose patients, all would fail his qualitative measurements and thus be fit
candidates for euthanasia. 14
B. Ethical Presuppositions
1. The conservative position is based upon three major ethical considerations: the principle of the sanctity of life; a theory of natural
law, which includes natural , or prima facie, obligations; and the
"wedge" argument.

a. The sanctity of life principle is claimed to be inherent in the
human experience. All people are aware of, at least, the value of their
own lives. Theologically understood, life is a gift of a loving God. It is
simply given with no prior considerations as to management potential
or worthiness. It is given to man as a sacred trust to be protected and
revered. It is, in the Judeo-Christian tradition, created in the image of
God. This gives man a "right to life" which is grounded in his divine
origin. This right to life is claimed to be "the basis of all other human
rights and is the foundation of civilized society." 15 This primary valuation of life is also reflected in the second principle:
b. The theory of natural law is said to be revealed in the natural
process, and intuitively known to all men through the powers of
human rationality.1 6 Natural law theory asserts that man universally
has a prima facie obligation to do good (positive natural law) and to
avoid evil (negative natural law). Positive natural law prescribes that
certain moral acts be done because they are intrinsically good. Man
has a primary obligation to do good. Negative natural law, on the
other hand, proscribes certain actions which are intrinsically evil and
actions which are evil because of the attending circumstances. 19
Therefore, man has the primary duty to avoid evil - and there are no
exceptions. 18
A problem often occurs when natural law theory is applied to disjunctive ends and means. Normally we would insist that means be commensurate with the ends in view; that is to say, moral ends cannot be
achieved through immoral means . Here natural law theory introduces
an appropriate corrective to what might become too rigid a canon of
action, the principle of proportionality. For example, normally providing medical support services for life is considered morally good. But
when those support services are only sustaining a terminally ill life,
wracked by pain and in which there is no hope for recovery, then
there are morally appropriate proportional limits on how much support we must provide. We must note here that it is within this prinFebruary, 1978
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ciple of proportionality that the Roman Catholic Church has discussed
the difference between ordinary and extraordinary 19 medical therapy,20 and also put forth the principle of double effect. 21
These two presuppositions of the conservative position, namely the
sanctity of life principle and the natural law theory, as far as they have
been explicated here, this author can fully support. The third presupposition, however, remains problematic.
c. The wedge argument can be stated in two ways. First, using
the Kantian principle of uniyersality, (i.e., in order for an act to be
good, the principle of that act must be universally good for all. For
example, truth telling, being a universally good principle, is morally
acceptable, while lying, which can never be universally good, is morally unacceptable), this says that what is wrong for a society is wrong
for an individual. 22 Or, second, using the description of Norman St.
John Stevas: "Once a concession about the disposability of innocent
life is made in one sphere it will inevitably spread to others." 23 The
horrors of this fear are vividly described by Yale Kamisar :
" Miss Voluntary Euthan asia is not likely to be going it alone for very long.
Many of her admirers . . . would be neither surprised nor distressed to see her
joined by Miss Euthanitize the Congenital Idiots and Miss Euthanitize the
Permanently Insane and Miss Euthanatize the Senile Dementia. And these
lasses - whether or not they themselves constitu te a 'parade of horrors' - certainly make excellent majorettes for such a parad e." 24

The argument is the familiar "domino theory" that warns that once
you admit one, it is only a matter of time before others are included.
Or, "give an inch and they'll take a mile ." Or, once the "edge of the
wedge" finds its way in, the whole wedge follows. The argument is
also called "the slippery slope," i.e., once you begin to slide, you will
eventually end up at the moral bottom.
We must note here that the "wedge argument" has been the most
powerful deterrent argument against any policy of euthanasia. 25 But
it is problematic because of its own inner assumptions, which are :
a . To make an exception to a rule would destroy the rule. To recognize euthanasia as morally acceptable in one case would make arbitrary any attempt to prohibit it for other cases.
b. The assumption that the worst must happen. To recognize euthanasia as morally acceptable in one case would naturally lead to outrageous abuses, terminating the lives of anyone, and perhaps everyone,
who did not meet the minimum criteria for humanhood.
c. That humans are incapable of discriminating between cases that
might be considered for euthanasia because of all of the uncertainties
involved.
All of these underlying assumptions for the "wedge argument" are
problematic, indeed. First, it is not at all clear that exceptions to rules
destroy the rules. Second, there is no rational basis for asserting that
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the worst must happen. And, finally, to suggest that human beings
cannot discriminate between cases raises a serious and, I believe, unfounded attack upon man's conceptual powers .
2. The liberal position, on the other hand, is based upon certain
assumptions about what meaningful human life is and, at least according to Joseph Fletcher, a "situational" understanding of how love can
best be served, given a situation in which all the alternatives may be
less than desirable. 26 This position too has problems. Indeed, the fears
of abuse are much clearer here. The guidelines of this position are
supplied by Fletcher himself in his presuppositions of "Situation
Ethics." They are,
a. Against the "sanctity of' life principle" he places pragmatism,
which admits no absolutes of any kind, and relativizes every human
value to its utility, its workability, and satisfactory consequences.
Accordingly, human life is definable by qualitative measurements.
Criteria can be established to determine the relative value of life so
that life with little or no relative value is expendable. 27
b. Against the natural law theory, Fletcher places personalism,
which "rejects the vitalism and naturalistic determinism of natural law
and replaces these values with personal values of human dignity, selfpossession and freedom of choice." 28 Theoretically, then, individuals
who cannot appropriately appreciate and express these meaningful
human values do not qualify as persons, and therefore, have little or
no claim to the right to life . 29
c. In contrast to the "wedge argument" Fletcher believes that relativism can help identify how love can best be served; i.e., all moral
norms are subject to the requirements of love. If love permits, or
better, requires euthanasia, so be it.30
In fairness, we must add that Fletcher believes he is developing a
truly moral approach toward a policy of euthanasia. He calls for moral
responsibility in making these heavy decisions. But he believes that
"even the most revered principles can be thrown aside if they conflict
in any concrete case with love. "31
Pragmatism, personalism and relativism add up to a totally subjective ethic without any necessary guarantee that any of our medical,
or even pastoral, decisions will be consistent and rationally understood . Here the temptations to abuse become legitimated in the fuzziness of our moral criteria. The "parade of horrors" that Kamisar
envisioned, might too easily become a reality.
C. A Synthetic Possibility For A Soft Paradigm
As an ethicist with a particular theological heritage, my own position with regard to the development of a policy of euthanasia is centered within what I accept as the foundational assumptions of pastoral
care. Let me just briefly list these:
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1. That we have an underlying sense of Christian values;
2. That we are dedicated persons in our professions; dedicated to the care of
souls as well as the care of bodies;
3. That we h ave a sense of ministry and mission in our work;
4. That we are competent in our work; that we are concerned about continuously examining our own lives, our own values and how we do or do not
communicate these values to others;
5. That we are essentially fulfilled persons; that we enjoy the challenges that
life provides and are not always chafing at the bit;
6. That we are growth oriented; that we h ave a thirst for knowledge, both in
our medical or pastoral specialities as well as in our quest for greater humanistic insights into life.

There is often a false fear among many people that says somehow
that when we get into the thicket of decision-making in difficult cases,
we are not going to be able to decide what is the best course of action
to suggest or take. Even those who profess a sound religious faith, are
often dismayed at their inability to reach decisions regarding care for
terminally ill persons, whether they be children, adults, or the elderly.
I am certainly not going to suggest that such decision-making can be
simple or easy. The more difficult the case, the more difficult the
decision. What I am going to suggest, however, is that our difficulty
might be due to a false separation of human values regarding life and
death. Indeed, I would suppose that if we examine ourselves, we
would find that most of us only have values of life and have not
thought very much about values of death, whether it be our own
death or someone else's.
As medical and para-medical professionals, we have a unique relationship to people in need. We have an opportunity to reach out to
them in their need with all of the power of both our medicines and
our own personal commitments. Euthanasia may very well be a difficult testing ground for our sense of values. But, if our values are
important, then they should stand up to the most difficult of challenges . To ignore or deny the challenge is not to arrive at a satisfactory
answer.
I am going to insist that under no circumstance ought euthanasia be
considered as an alternative to care. We have no moral ground on
which to stand whatever, if we euthanize to avoid care. The mandate
of the medical profession is to provide care.3 2 All other values rank
below this primary obligation. The mandates to promote life and relieve suffering can only be properly understood within the context of
human care . To prolong life or to alleviate pain outside this context
becomes an abuse of the medical privilege.
Likewise, under this rubric of care, specific therapies become meaningful activities. And under the rubric of care these medical therapies
may have limited ranges of effectiveness. It is under this rubric of care
that we can morally discontinue life-sustaining therapies because they
are non-restorative and inefficacious.
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What I am suggesting here is that the continuation of biological life
is not the ultimate end value. We must not sacrifice life as long as
there is reasonable hope and we certainly must not sacrifice hope
when there is reasonable life. But both ·hope and life have reasonable
limits which the rubric of care recognizes. Now, some specifics.
1. My conservative nature requires that I cling fast to the sanctity of
life principle; 33 that life is a sacred gift, given to us in trust by a loving
God. But, I must also recognize that this gift, and the sacredness
which accompanies it, also have limits; i.e., there comes a point in
time when the gift is withdrawn and with that action the sacredness
diminishes.
If we regard life as a gift from God, we must recognize that He gives
it to us in trust that we will use it appropriately to our understanding
of His love. In recognizing that life and its sacredness have limits, we
are recognizing the trustfulness with which the gift of life is given.
This, of course, has biblical precedence. In the Scriptures, both persons and places can have sacredness. And this special status can be
lost, not only because of sin and defilement, but also because of the
presence of God being withdrawn .
For me, this biblical distinction applies to life and death. The Spirit
of God is given to create life; it is also withdrawn as life loses its
vitality, its entelechy, as manifested in irreversible coma, a flat (or
essentially flat) electroencephalogram, or being in a "persistent vegetative state." Charles Curran makes a distinction between the "process
of living" and the "process of dying." The point at which the "process
of dying" overtakes the "process of living" is when life-preserving
therapies can be discontinued because they are inefficacious. 34 For
me, this is the withdrawal of that God-given sacredness which the gift
possesses. My conservative nature requires me, therefore, to reject the
need to prolong life as long as technically possible providing that
certain base line criteria are established, e.g., the Harvard "brain
death "35 or irreversible coma.

2. My more moderate nature forces me to recognize that under the
rubric of care excruciating and intractable pain is also destructive to
the sanctity of life. Here pain moves beyond the therapeutic bounds
of "purifying the soul" and is diminutive to the sacredness of that life.
Under the rubric of care our mandate is to relieve pain. If we can
decrease pain, even with high dosages, without depressing any physical
and conceptual powers, we must do it. But if we cannot, then our first
obligation is to relieve pain.
Now, what I am suggesting might not be so different from what is,
in fact, being done today in every hospital. With perhaps one exception. If this be passive euthanasia, let us recognize it as such and see it
as one of our legitimate values of life within the rubric of care. We
may wish to call it "terminal therapy" rather than euthanasia, but we
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must recognize that it is a different kind of therapy than chemo- or
excisional therapy, which aim primarily at cure or remisison. This is
"terminal care therapy" and we should have no qualms about admitting it, to each other, to the family, and even to the patient, if this is
still possible.
Daniel Maguire, in a 1974 essay published in the Humanist, recognizes that given a particular patient, we may all agree that the most
merciful thing would be death, while at the same time realizing that
this process of dying is not the most merciful. 36 We must somehow
make it clear to both patients and the public that our purpose is to
provide care, whether it be health-care to those who can be restored to
health, or terminal-care to those who cannot. The reality of death
must be recognized, otherwise it will continue to be the dragon of fear
that it is for many people today . We must realize that people do not
fear death as much as they fear the process of dying. If we can assure
our patients of our commitment to care, they will be less fearful of
their own dying and more capable of dealing with their other anxieties.
3. We must be very clear in our discussion of euthanasia as having a
legitimate place in the medical mandate of care that we not be misunderstood. We must neither see euthanasia as an alternative to care
nor suggest it for individuals who are not terminally ill, in intractable
pain or irretrievably comatose. 37 Here is the limit of my "soft" paradigm. We cannot morally extend it to persons not in a life-threatening
terminal conditions. A distinction supplied by Paul Ramsey is important; a distinction between exceptions to a rule and exemptions from
a rule.
Life-Sustaining Therapies
The rule would be to provide life-sustaining therapies of care to all.
The exception to this rule would be, as already described, persons
terminally ill and irretrievably comatose or in intractable pain. Exemptions from even the consideration of euthanasia would be persons not
in the terminal stages of dying, or to use the terms of Kamisar, the
"congenital idiots ... the permanently insane ... the senile dementia." These may represent those in society who are not as pleasant to
look at, or relate to, but they are not, and never ought to be, the
candidates for social extermination.
It is important to note here that the present state of American case
law makes this point explicitly clear. Normally law exists to protect
innocent life,38 i.e., life that cannot protect itself.39 An example of
this would be the ruling of Judge Muir at the Superior Court level in
New Jersey that Karen Quinlan could not be removed from her lifesustaining respirator. 40 However, the New Jersey State Supreme
Court, in reversing Judge Muir has provided an appropriate corrective
to the belief that the law always protects life to the fullest extent,
50

Linacre Quarterly

regardless of how terminally debilitated that life might actually be.
The court ruled that:
"We think that the State' s interest contra weakens and the individual 's right to
privacy grows as the degree of bodily invasion increases and the prognosis dims.
Ultimately there comes a point at which the individual's rights overcome the
State interest. "4 1

This is an extremely important legal step in morally recognizing
that life has limits beyond which it ought not to be sustained. But the
limits must be reached; and we cannot arbitrarily decide those limits.
They are, as the court specified, to be determined medically, not
socially.
If this guideline is followed, the "wedge argument" is countered.
Human beings are capable of discriminating between cases and can
appropriately decide when a life is beyond hope and beyond our
ability to save. Yes, of course, there will be difficult cases, and cases
which are not immediately clear. In these instances we must decide
in favor of sustaining life. But, when the evidence is irrefutable, we
must be able to express death as a positive value of life.
4. The only remaining question I wish to explore is the question of
"who" should decide. Again the recent New Jersey Supreme Court
Decision in the Case of Karen Quinlan is significant. Earlier, Judge
Muir, in refusing to grant permission to remove her from the respirator, ruled that the decision was purely a medical decision. 42 The
family could make their request known, but the doctor must make the
ultimate decision.
The Supreme Court ruling reversed Judge Muir and said that it was
a decision which the family must make.
This was significant in that
it gave Karen back to her parents for this final decision about her care.
This is not to say that the doctor couldn't have made this decision
wisely, but rather that values were at stake here that clearly went
beyond medicine.
Ideally, of course, it would be valuable to know Karen's wishes. 44
Indeed, the patient's own wishes must be sought, if this is possible.
But when this cannot ever be acquired, the proper locus for the decision is the family. My own addition to this would be to require that
the attending physician say "when" this would be medically appropriate, for he has much greater training and experience in recognizing
when a person is in the moribund state.
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